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REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS ON CHARGES OF
ECONOMIC CRIME: UNETHICAL WHEN DONE FOR A FEE
David Orentlicher*
INTRODUCTION
As prosecutors have increasingly invoked asset forfeiture laws in their war
against crime, scholars have harshly criticized the use of forfeiture laws to
seize attorneys' fees. In cases in which attorneys' fees are seized, prosecutors
claim that defendants are paying their lawyers with the proceeds of criminal
activity. For example, drug dealers might use the profits from cocaine or her-
oin sales to finance their defense, or embezzlers might use the skimmed funds
to defray their legal expenses. According to many commentators, attorneys'
fee forfeitures raise serious constitutional problems. If payments to attorneys
may be seized by the government, criminal defendants will be greatly con-
strained in their ability to retain a lawyer, thereby compromising the defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel and undermining the fairness of the
criminal justice system.'
In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the Supreme Court
rejected the constitutional challenge to seizures of attorneys' fees. However,
the debate over seizures of fees often misses an important concern. The real
issue at stake is not whether prosecutors can seize attorneys' fees, but whether
attorneys should be able to accept the fees in the first place. This misplaced
focus reflects the fact that the attorneys' fee issue has been viewed primarily
through the lens of defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel, without
adequate consideration of lawyers' ethical obligations to decline their clients'
ill-gotten gains. By taking into account lawyers' professional responsibilities
* Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.D., Harvard
Law School 1986; M.D., Harvard Medical School 1981. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Frank
Bowman, John Connor, Judy Failer, Philip Guentert, William Hodes, William Marsh, James Mutchnik and
Stuart Green and the helpful research assistance of Jennifer Bagby and Will Binder.
See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory
to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1; Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to
Avoid It, 43 U. mlmIL. REv. 765 (1989).
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as well as defendant's constitutional rights, one can come to a more complete
understanding of the attorneys' fee issue. The criminal justice system can
shape its ethical and legal rules not only in terms of the relationship between
individual defendants and the state, but also in terms of the relationship
between individual defendants and their lawyers.
When a lawyer's moral duties are adequately considered, it becomes clear
that it is almost always unethical for attorneys to accept fees for defending in-
dividuals charged with economic crimes. Such individuals should have to rely
on court-appointed counsel (or pro se representation) for their legal defense.
This conclusion rests on the important moral ground that lawyers may not traf-
fic in the ill-gotten gains of their clients, which means that lawyers cannot ac-
cept payment when there is good reason to think that at least some of the pay-
ment comes from illicit funds.
Commentators often have misjudged the attorneys' fee issue for a second
reason-an incomplete analysis of the consequences for the quality of legal
representation if criminal defendants cannot use their funds to hire a lawyer.
As many commentators observe, the justice system is poorly served if defen-
dants are denied good legal counsel.3 In an adversarial system of justice
premised on vigorous advocacy for both sides, we must be suspicious of con-
victions obtained when defendants lack effective representation. According to
the usual analysis, if alleged perpetrators of economic crimes are forced to re-
tain public defenders (or other court-appointed lawyers),4 an already over-
whelmed public lawyering system will be even further stretched. Court-
appointed lawyers will be unable to provide good representation, and prose-
cutors will gain an unfair advantage over defendants.
While there is much to be said for the concern about defendants' being
prohibited from using illicit funds to hire an attorney, this concern is
insufficiently persuasive. Other commentators are correct that there would be
a substantial shift in representation from paid lawyers to court-appointed
lawyers if attorneys could not accept possibly tainted funds from their clients.
However, by assuming a static rather than a dynamic perspective, these
3 See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 1; Winick, supra note 1.
4 Many court-appointed lawyers are employed as public defenders; in addition, many lawyers in pri-
vate practice accept court appointments on a regular or occasional basis. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J.
DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings No.
NCJ-158909, 1996); Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58(1) LAw & CONTEMI. PROBs. 31 (1995).
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commentators inadequately analyze how such a shift would affect the quality
of legal counsel for criminal defendants. That is, the problem with the usual
analysis is its assumption of a static system: we have only so many public
defenders, so increasing their workload would mean that they can spend even
less time on each case. However, like other systems, the criminal justice
system is dynamic. If external conditions change, the justice system will adapt
to the new conditions, and the effects of the changes will be different than if
the system were static.
Accordingly, one needs to ask from a dynamic perspective what changes
will take place if lawyers decline paid representation when economic crimes
are involved and potential clients are sent to public defenders. From this per-
spective, there is reason to believe that a major shift from paid counsel to
court-appointed lawyers for economic crimes will result in an enhancement
rather than a deterioration of the public lawyering system. Currently, there is
relatively weak public support for funding of court-appointed lawyers. Most
people probably see the funding as involving a redistribution of money from
themselves to indigent criminals, a class of persons that they dislike and do not
expect to join. However, if all persons charged with economic crimes must
turn to court-appointed lawyers, the constituency for a strong public lawyering
system will widen. It will widen in terms of numbers of total supporters and,
more importantly, it will widen in terms of numbers of politically influential
supporters. Not only will drug dealers and convenience store robbers be sent
to public defenders, but so will business people who commit securities fraud,
antitrust violations or environmental crimes. If corporate executives recognize
that they may someday need a strong public lawyering system to protect their
own interests, they will be much more likely to support adequate funding for
court-appointed lawyers.
In other words, denying paid counsel for the defense of economic crimes
will put more people behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance.6 It is easy for
people to withhold support for funding of court-appointed lawyers when it
seems reasonably clear that they will never need a court-appointed lawyer
5 Likewise, we have only so much funding for other court-appointed lawyers, so increasing their
workload also would unduly stretch their capacity to provide representation.
6 The "veil of ignorance" is an analytic device for assessing the fairness of a proposed policy. Ordi-
narily, people will support or oppose a policy proposal in large part based on whether it will help or hurt
them personally rather than on whether it is a fair policy overall. If, however, people did not know whether
they would be helped or hurt by the policy (that is, if they were viewing the policy from behind a "veil of
ignorance"), they would judge the policy in terms of its overall fairness. JOHN RAwLs, A THEoRY oF
JusTIcE 11-16 (1971).
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themselves. Most potential perpetrators of securities fraud, antitrust violations
or other "white-collar" crime assume they will be able to pay for a lawyer if
they are charged, so they need not worry about the quality of the public
lawyering system. Indeed, it is in their interest to spend fewer of their dollars
on the system through taxes so that they have more money to retain paid
counsel, if ever the need should arise. However, if people realize that they
may need a public defender themselves some day, because they will be
precluded from retaining paid counsel, they will be more willing to support
funding for public defenders. A seemingly ironic implication of this analysis
becomes clear: The public lawyering system could become stronger as it
becomes more widely used. Instead of becoming a drain on the system, the
expanded client base might well become a source of strength for the system.
How can one know that this scenario correctly predicts what will happen if
lawyers are limited in their freedom to accept legal fees from clients charged
with economic crimes? The situation instead could develop according to the
usual analysis, and the quality of representation would seriously deteriorate for
defendants charged with economic crimes. However, the important point is
that one really cannot say with any certainty which way it will go. There could
be good or bad consequences from tighter restrictions on the freedom of clients
to pay their legal fees with possibly tainted funds. In the face of such uncer-
tainty, society lacks sufficient justification to permit lawyers to accept the
funds. In order to override the important ethical principle that lawyers should
not accept ill-gotten gains, other important interests must be served by the
override. Because it is not clear whether the interests of criminal justice will
be better served if lawyers are permitted to accept fees from persons charged
with economic crimes, the ethics of the legal profession should not be com-
promised by allowing lawyers to be paid with possibly tainted funds.
The remainder of this Article will elaborate on these issues further. Part I
will discuss the relevant moral concerns, concluding that it is generally unethi-
cal for lawyers to accept fees from defendants who are charged with economic
crimes. Part II then will explain why the arguments in favor of permitting
lawyers to accept such fees are not persuasive. Accordingly, defendants
charged with economic crimes generally should rely on court-appointed law-
yers for their representation.
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I. ACCEPTING FEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF ECONOMIC CRIMES
Is GENERALLY UNETHICAL
A. The Duty to Decline Stolen Money
When attorneys accept fees for the representation of people charged with
economic crimes, serious ethical and legal problems arise. To demonstrate this
point, I will start with a simple, illustrative case. Assume that, after identifying
their suspect from pictures taken by hidden video cameras, the police arrest an
unemployed young adult and charge the person with multiple robberies of
automatic teller machines (ATMs). Assume further that the person comes
from a poor family and has never held a steady job. After being released on
bail, the defendant seeks legal counsel and pulls out $20,000 in cash to pay the
lawyer's up-front fee.7
Ethical and legal principles indicate that the lawyer should refuse the cash.
If the lawyer accepts the fee, the lawyer likely is accepting property that
rightly belongs to someone other than the client, for it is highly probable that
the source of the cash is the proceeds of the robberies. Given the defendant's
employment and family history, there is little reason to think that the $20,000
was lawfully obtained by the defendant. Because it is ethically and legally im-
permissible for lawyers to receive stolen property, the lawyer would have to
decline the fee,8 and the defendant would have to obtain the services of a court-
appointed lawyer.
My analysis of this illustrative case reflects a widely-held view. When
academic experts discuss the seizure of attorneys' fees, they routinely use a
case very similar to this one as an example of a case in which the lawyer
clearly cannot accept the fee.9 There are several reasons for this conclusion.
The money belongs to the bank, so the lawyer may not take it for personal use.
7 This example is adapted from I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT § 1.6:405, at 210 (2d ed.
Supp. 1996).
8 See id. at 210-211; see also In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713,714 (4th Cir. 1967); Bennett v. State, 211 So.
2d 520 (Miss. 1968). If the lawyer took the fee and then realized that it had been stolen, there would be an
obligation to turn the money over to law enforcement officials. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL Emcs 645 (1986).
9 See, e.g., 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.6:405, at 210-11; Kathleen F. Brickey, Tainted As-
sets and the Right to Counsel: The Money Laundering Conundrum, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 50-53 (1988);
Thomas D. Morgan, An Introduction to the Debate Over Fee Forfeitures, 36 EMORY LJ. 755, 755-56
(1987).
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Rather, the money needs to be returned to the bank. Also, by taking the
money, the lawyer would become a participant in the defendant's criminal ac-
tivity, and lawyers, who are officers of the court, should not foster the criminal
activity of other persons.10 To be sure, the lawyer would not be complicit in
the robbery itself, but the lawyer would be facilitating the robbery. Theft is
worthwhile only to the extent that the stolen property can be turned to one's
advantage. If a bank robber can find no one to accept the stolen money, there
is little point to committing the robbery in the first place. Hence, the lawyer
would provide a critical link in the defendant's criminal scheme. Accordingly,
as state codes reflect, the criminal law has traditionally prohibited the receipt
of stolen property." There is a third reason lawyers cannot accept funds from
bank robbers. By taking the money, the lawyer would be helping the defen-
dant conceal some very important evidence of the theft.
2
Accepting the $20,000 fee also might put the attorney in violation of laws
other than state stolen property laws. A federal statute prohibits individuals
from "engag[ing] in a monetary transaction" with "criminally derived prop-
erty" if the value of the property exceeds $10,000 and the criminal activity
falls within a long list of crimes, including bank robbery. 3 Seemingly, the
statute includes a provision that would exclude attorneys' fees from its cover-
age. In the definitions clause, the term "monetary transaction" does not in-
clude "any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution."'4 However, this
exclusion was rendered a nullity when the Supreme Court rejected a Sixth
Amendment challenge to attorneys' fees forfeitures in Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States.'
To be sure, it may be the case that the $20,000 is not tainted money. If that
is so, the lawyer could accept the fee. However, the burden should be placed
on the lawyer to determine reliably that the cash was in fact lawfully obtained,
because the circumstances surrounding the proffer of cash strongly suggest
10 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.2(d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not...
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... ).
n See CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.40 (McKinney 1999); In re Ry-
der, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va. 1967) (applying Virginia law). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AusIN W. Scowr, JR., SUBSTANTiVE CRInMNAL LAW §8.10(a), at 422 (1986).
12 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. Er AL., THE LAW AND ETmCS OF LAWYERING 49-50 (2d ed. 1994).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1994), which makes bank
robbery a federal offense).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1994).
15 491 U.S. 617,623-33 (1989).
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that the money came from someone else's till. 6 When the likelihood is very
high that the client will be paying with funds that were stolen, the lawyer must
take steps to ensure that no ill-gotten gains are accepted. In contrast, lawyers
ought not to be required to ascertain the exact source of the client's fee in cases
in which there is no presumption of taint. Extensive audits of potential clients
can chill a lawyer-client relationship 17 and can make it very difficult for clients
to maintain their privacy. Thus, for example, when O.J. Simpson retained his
lawyers, they could accept his payments because there was no reason to think
that his money was taken from Nicole Brown Simpson or Ronald Goldman
when they were murdered or that his money was otherwise earned unlawfully.
Even after making inquiries about the source of funds, the lawyer may still
be unsure whether the funds were legally obtained. Clients may not be forth-
coming with their answers, or their answers may not seem fully trustworthy.
An important question, then, is: How likely must it be that a fee would be paid
out of stolen property before a lawyer would be obligated to decline the fee?
There are two parts to this question. First, how likely is it that the client
committed the crime? Second, will the client be paying the lawyer's fee out of
the stolen funds or out of previously and licitly obtained funds? In the remain-
der of this subpart, I will respond to the first question; in the next subpart, I
will respond to the second question.
With regard to the likelihood that the client is guilty, lawyers can turn to
the Model Penal Code and state criminal codes for their provisions regarding
the possession of stolen property. According to the Model Penal Code, people
are guilty of theft if they receive someone else's property with the knowledge
that the property was stolen or with the belief "that it has probably been sto-
len."" As one court has held, prosecution for theft is permissible if the defen-
dant believed it was "more likely than not" that the property was stolen. 9
Most modem state codes follow the Model Penal Code example. 20 From the
16 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.6:405, at 210-11.
17 See Morgan Cloud, Government Intrusions into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee
Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY LJ. 817, 827
(1987).
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6 (emphasis added).
19 State v. Gabriel, 473 A.2d 300,306 n.7 (Conn. 1984).
20 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-16 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119(8) (1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 359 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. § 609.53 (West 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:7
(1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-7 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3925 (West 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs § 22-30A-7 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1995). See generally 2 LAFAVE
& Scorr, supra note 11, at 428.
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law of theft, then, one might conclude that, when lawyers are trying to decide
whether their fees are paid from stolen property, they should be guided by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. If the preponderance of circumstan-
tial evidence indicates that a proffered fee represents the fruits of criminal ac-
tivity, the lawyer should refuse to accept the funds.
However, the standard for finding someone guilty of trafficking in stolen
property is not necessarily the appropriate standard for a lawyer's ethical re-
sponsibilities when offered possibly tainted fees. Indeed, there are three im-
portant principles in law and ethics that suggest a stricter standard, such as a
requirement that lawyers refuse fees once there is good reason (or "probable
cause") to believe that the funds come from stolen property.2'
According to the first important principle, society ordinarily holds people
to higher standards for their ethical responsibilities than for their legal
responsibilities. For example, a physician may have an ethical duty to treat
patients even when they cannot pay for their care, but physicians generally do
not have a legal duty to provide medical c~xe without compensation.2
Similarly, parents may have a moral duty to provide the best possible
upbringing for their children, but they have a legal duty only to provide a non-
abusive upbringing. While people disagree on exactly why morality differs
from law, and indeed some people try to impose their sense of morality
through the law,23 it is generally accepted that one's legal duties are a subset of
one's ethical duties24 The law, it is said, tries to enforce a minimum standard
of conduct.2s Morality, in contrast, tries to bring about an ideal standard of
conduct, a way of living that is aspirational rather than mandatory. Common-
ly, the distinction between law and morality reflects a desire to accommodate
Federal laws governing the receipt of stolen property typically require a showing that the defendant
had knowledge that the property was stolen. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1994); id. §§ 2312-2318. However,
knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 579
(lst Cir. 1981); United States v. Hardesty, 645 F.2d 612,614 (8th Cir. 1981).
21 Some states already have a standard similar to probable cause for their stolen property laws. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-16 (1994) (individuals are guilty of receiving stolen property if they have
"reasonable grounds" to believe the property is stolen); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.53 (West 1987) (people are
guilty of receiving stolen property if they have "reason to know" that the property is stolen).
22 See WaIjmmJ. CuRRANErAL., HEALTHCARELAW ANDETHI-s 128-29 (5th ed. 1998).
23 See JuDrrt N. Sltm.AR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALs, AND POLITICALTRIALS 39-64 (1986).
24 Compare ANDRI.w ALTmAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 35-
37 (1996) (describing the relation between law and morality under the natural law theory of St. Thomas
Aquinas), with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1961) (describing the relation between law
and morality under his positive law theory).
25 See HART, supra note 24, at 188-89.
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different religious or philosophical views about the right and the good and to
use the law to reflect only those core social obligations to which all members
of society can subscribe.26 In addition, it often is thought that there are limits
to the effectiveness of the law in producing moral behavior. For some ethical
obligations, we must rely on moral suasion rather than legal mandates to bring
about the desired conduct. From the important principle that ethical duties
exceed legal duties, we would conclude that lawyers should decline fees that
might represent stolen funds under a stricter standard than that used for
holding a person liable under laws prohibiting the receipt of stolen property.
The second important principle relevant to determining the lawyer's ethical
duty to refuse a possibly tainted fee is that, in general, when society is willing
to impose legal duties, it is less willing to impose criminal liability than to im-
pose civil liability. Society gives people more leeway when it drafts criminal
laws than when it establishes rules of civil law. For simple negligence, for ex-
ample, individuals routinely will be held accountable under tort law, but rarely
so under the criminal law.2V Because of the profound social consequences of
labeling someone a criminal, society imposes only civil penalties on much le-
gal misconduct and reserves criminal penalties for the more serious miscon-
duct. Identifying misconduct as a crime rather than as a tort or other civil
wrong is an important way in which society expresses its greater moral con-
demnation of the misconduct.2s Thus, while legal duties generally are an im-
perfect measure of ethical duties, a person's responsibilities under the criminal
law are an even less appropriate measure of one's moral obligations. Accord-
ingly, one should be especially concerned about looking to criminal laws re-
garding stolen property as a guide to the ethical standards for lawyers who
might be paid from ill-gotten gains.
A third important principle suggests a heightened ethical standard for law-
yers in a position to accept possibly tainted funds. Not only are lawyers' ethi-
cal obligations higher than their legal obligations, but their ethical obligations
also are higher than those of lay persons. Among the hallmarks of a profession
are special expertise and self-regulation of that expertise according to rigorous
codes of conduct. 29 As it does for other professionals, society expects lawyers
26 See id.
27 See 1 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 11, § 3.7, at 325-26.
28 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMI. PROBS. 401, 404-05
(1958).
29 See ELIOTFREIDSON, PRoFESSiONALISMREBoRN: T-EORY, PROPHECY, AND PoLICY 62-64 (1994).
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to observe stricter ethical standards than are expected of other persons. ° Thus,
for example, it is commonly believed that lawyers should provide pro bono le-
gal services on a regular basis," even though it is not expected that landlords
set aside an apartment on a routine basis for those who are too poor to afford
the building's rent. Society also holds the legal profession to a higher ethical
standard because of lawyers' roles as officers of the court. As officers of the
court, lawyers should be especially reluctant to take payment of funds that
might have been stolen.
All of these reasons for a high professional standard suggest that lawyers
should employ a lower threshold than the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard from stolen property law when deciding whether to reject fees from
funds that might have been stolen. Because of the impropriety of lawyers' fa-
cilitating criminal activity, the profession should be fairly strict in setting ethi-
cal standards to prevent such facilitation. Accordingly, lawyers should decline
fees when there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the money was illegally got-
ten. In other words, the profession should employ a standard akin to the prob-
able cause standard in criminal law for suspecting someone of criminal activ-
ity.
If lawyers were required to decline fees from defendants charged with bank
robbery or other theft when there is reasonable suspicion that the money was
illegally obtained, then lawyers would almost always have to decline repre-
sentation of people charged with theft or other economic crimes. Because the
standard for the defense lawyer in deciding whether to accept the fee would be
the same as the burden of proof for the prosecutor to bring charges, it would be
a rare case in which lawyers fairly could conclude that there was no reasonable
suspicion of guilt. While I believe this is the correct result, it is necessary to
consider other important aspects of the analysis before reaching a firm conclu-
sion about the obligation of lawyers to decline a fee because it might represent
the proceeds of criminal activity. These other aspects are the subject of the
next two sections.
Before proceeding to the next section, I have one final point about the
threshold at which lawyers should decline possibly tainted fees. I have argued
that the profession should adopt a stricter standard than the preponderance of
30 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 38 (2d
ed. 1998).
31 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuct Rule 6.1 (1983) ("A lawyer should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.").
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the evidence standard from stolen property law, that in terms of ethics, it
makes more sense to have a reasonable suspicion standard. But even if it is
more appropriate to employ the same standard for the lawyer's ethical and
legal obligations (i.e., the preponderance of the evidence standard from stolen
property law), lawyers likely still would be disqualified from accepting fees
from most defendants who are charged with economic crimes. Because
criminal defendants generally have committed the crime charged,32 lawyers in
most cases will probably believe it more likely than not that their client is
guilty and that the client's payments would come out of tainted funds.
B. The Inability to Separate Licit and Illicit Funds
Until now, I have focused on the degree of suspicion the lawyer has in the
client's guilt: should lawyers decline a fee when they think it more likely than
not that the client is guilty, or as soon as they have reasonable suspicion of the
client's guilt? To complete the analysis, we also need to consider the likeli-
hood that, even if the client is guilty, the attorney's fee would come from le-
gally-earned funds rather than out of the proceeds of crime. In other words,
for a lawyer to believe that a proffered fee was illegally obtained, the lawyer
would have to believe two things: that the defendant committed a theft and that
the payment to the lawyer came out of the funds that were stolen. Some
thieves make some of their money legally and some illegally. Perhaps the de-
fendant would be paying the lawyer's fee out of legally-earned assets. In the
example of the alleged bank robber who was unemployed and had no real
means of family support, it would make sense to conclude that the defendant
was paying the attorneys' fees out of stolen money. However, we can easily
imagine cases in which the question would not be so clear, as, for example,
when banking executives embezzle funds from their employers.33 An execu-
tive might be sufficiently wealthy that, even after returning the embezzled
funds, there would be enough money left to pay a lawyer. In such a case, is it
permissible to accept payment from the client, on the ground that the payment
is coming from the client's legally earned assets?
To answer this question, it will be helpful to consider a second illustrative
case. In June 1995, the Justice Department launched an investigation of
32 See ALANM. DERSHOWrZ, TmBEsTDEFENSE xxi (1982).
33 This example was suggested by 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, at 210.
34 In the real world, of course, it is entirely possible that embezzlers often steal money because they
cannot cover their financial obligations with lawfully earned money. For example, a bank official might
embezzle funds to cover losses from gambling or bad investments.
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Archer Daniels Midland ("Archer Daniels") on suspicion of price-fixing
violations in the global markets for high-fructose corn syrup (used to sweeten
foods), citric acid (added to food for its tart taste and preservative properties)
and lysine (an amino acid added to animal feed to stimulate growth and lean
muscle development)." The company pled guilty to charges in October
1996,36 and in September 1998, a federal jury in Chicago convicted three
Archer Daniels executives of engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices in the
lysine market.37 According to newspaper reports, the company paid the legal
fees for its executives38 and brought "enormous legal firepower" to the case in
39doing so.
When Archer Daniels asked lawyers to defend its executives against the
antitrust charges, the lawyers must have had good reason to believe that the
company was guilty of the charges. But did the lawyers have good reason to
believe that Archer Daniels would pay them out of profits derived from the
antitrust conspiracy? In one view, there was nothing unethical about the law-
yers' accepting payment of their fees from Archer Daniels. Presumably, the
company earned much, if not most, of its profits honestly. According to a
common analysis, it was ethically acceptable for the lawyers to represent
Archer Daniels, as long as the company had sufficient funds that were legally-
earned from which it could pay its legal fees.4 In other words, there would be
no problem accepting payment from Archer Daniels as long as the fee was
lower in amount than the company's legally obtained assets. Under this analy-
sis, it is assumed that Archer Daniels drew on all of its licit funds to pay the
lawyers before turning to any of its illicit funds.
While this approach makes a good deal of sense, it also leads to a morally
perverse result. Criminals who make their money both licitly and illicitly
would be better able to hire the most talented lawyers than criminals who do
35 See Barnaby J. Feder, Investigation Of Company Stirs Curiosity, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1995, at D4.
36 The company also agreed to pay a $100 million fine. See Nancy Millman, Indictments May Lift
Curtain on ADM Price-Fixing Case, Clu. TRm., Dec. 4, 1996, at 1.
37 United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. l11. 1998); United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp.
2d 863 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Two of the defendants each were sentenced to two years in prison and fined
$350,000; the third defendant received a two and one-half year sentence. See Kurt Eichenwald, Three Sen-
tenced in Archer Daniels Midland Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at Cl.
38 See Millman, supra note 36.
39 Kurt Eichenwald, Former Archer Daniels Executives Are Found Guilty of Price Fixing, N.Y. T IMES,
Sep. 18, 1998, at Al. An economist who has studied the price-fixing conspiracies estimates that Archer
Daniels and its co-conspirators have spent more than $75 million on legal fees. See John M. Connor, The
Global Lysine Price-Fixing Conspiracy of 1992-1995, 19 REv. AGRIC. ECON. 412,419-20 (1997).
40 See 1 HAZARD &HODES, supra note 7, § 1.6:405, at210-11.
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not have a source of legally earned funds. Guilty corporate executives and
Wall Street financiers would be more likely than other defendants to be
acquitted, despite their guilt, by virtue of being able to afford very skilled legal
counsel. Yet, though we generally cannot excuse criminal behavior, we can at
least understand more readily why the indigent person with dim opportunities
for gainful employment would turn to crime than why a successful business-
person would do so.
An alternative analysis would take a diametrically opposite view. Instead
of assuming that illegally-obtained funds were the last funds used to pay attor-
neys' fees, we could assume that illegally-obtained funds were the first funds
used. If Archer Daniels probably had some illicit earnings, the lawyers would
have to assume that the first dollars they received would come from ill-gotten
gains, and the lawyers would be unable to accept any payment from the com-
pany. The company's officials would have to turn to court-appointed counsel
for their representation.
Indeed, some courts have used this approach in asset forfeiture cases to im-
pose a very tough standard on recipients of funds from criminals who want to
show that the funds did not derive from criminal activity. For example, in a
case involving funds in a bank account that were allegedly the proceeds of il-
legal drug dealing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed
that the government could assume that all of the tainted money was paid out in
a particular transaction or that all of the tainted money still remained in the
bank account.4' In other words, once the government ascertained the amount
of the tainted money, it could choose where the tainted money went. Applying
this theory in a case like the one involving Archer Daniels, the government
could assume that at least some of the attorneys' fees were tainted if Archer
Daniels had some tainted earnings. In addition, the government could assume
that all of the fees paid were tainted if the total fees did not exceed the total il-
licit earnings of Archer Daniels.
However, whether one assumes that illegally obtained funds are used first
or last to pay attorneys' fees, the analysis employs a dubious legal and eco-
nomic fiction: it assumes that companies or people segregate their assets into a
legally obtained pool and an illegally obtained pool and that some expenses are
paid with the legally obtained assets while other expenses are paid with the il-
legally obtained assets. What really happens is that assets are mixed, and
41 United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-60 (2d Cir. 1986).
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companies like Archer Daniels pay their lawyers with a combination of legally
and illegally obtained funds. In the antitrust litigation, the most logical conclu-
sion is that Archer Daniels's lawyers received some tainted money and some
untainted money.
What this reality suggests is that Archer Daniels's lawyers acted improp-
erly when they accepted their fees. For every dollar they received, they indu-
bitably accepted some ill-gotten gains, thereby violating their ethical and legal
obligation to decline such payments.
The lawyers might argue that only a small percentage of their fee was il-
licit. Archer Daniels's earnings from lysine and the other products for which it
allegedly fixed prices probably amounted to a small percentage of the firm's
overall earnings. There may have been some tainted funds in the firm's pay-
ments, but the illicit dollars likely were dwarfed by the licit dollars. 2 Accord-
ing to this view, lawyers can accept possibly tainted fees as long as most of the
fees would come from legally obtained dollars. Obviously, there would be
disagreement as -to whether fifty-one percent, sixty-seven percent, seventy-five
percent or some other percentage of the fee would have to come from legiti-
mate funds, but there would be leeway allowed to accept possibly tainted
money.
This argument is not persuasive. Lawyers should not justify accepting a
small percentage of tainted funds by pointing to the large percentage of
untainted funds any more than a pawn shop should justify accepting stolen
jewelry on the ground that it was only a small percentage of the total jewelry
accepted. If criminals could "launder" the proceeds of their criminal activity
simply by mixing them with some legally obtained money or other property,
then laws prohibiting the receipt of stolen property could easily be evaded.
42 Actually, this may not be accurate. While precise figures are not available, we do know that, before
the years in which Archer Daniels was accused of price-fixing in the markets for high-fructose corn syrup,
citric acid and lysine, its net earnings had been about $500 million a year for the previous five years. In the
first full year of the conspiracy, the company's net earnings jumped nearly 60%, to $796 million. See Con-
nor, supra note 39, at 414.
Moreover, in the market for lysine, the illicit profits clearly were substantial. The companies partici-
pating in the conspiracy had estimated total sales of lysine of $460 million in the United States during the
three-year period of the conspiracy, and the overcharge was estimated by the government at $78 million.
See Government's Redacted Supplemental Economic Submission Under the Alternative Fine Provision, 18
U.S.C. § 3571(d), at 3-4, United States v. Andreas, No. 96-CR-762 (N.D. Ill. April 12, 1999). Thus, the ill-
gotten gains were about 17% of sales. This figure is more than three times the company's usual profit mar-
gin. For all of its products (both high-profit margin and low-profit margin), Archer Daniels had after-tax
earnings of about 5.5% of sales. See Connor, supra note 39, at 414.
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Because it is impermissible, both ethically and legally, for lawyers to take
money that belongs to someone else, the lawyers should have refused the fees
proffered by Archer Daniels.
43
The lawyers might suggest a second way to justify the payment of their fee.
They might say that, if seventy-five percent of Archer Daniels's funds were
legally obtained, they could charge seventy-five percent of their usual fee. In
this way, the lawyers arguably would be accepting only legitimate money. If
they would have billed $160,000 for their services, they would bill seventy-
five percent of that amount, or $120,000, instead. However, it still would be
the case that twenty-five percent of the reduced fee would come from the de-
fendant's illicit funds. With a fee of $120,000, seventy-five percent of the
$120,000, or $90,000, would be from legitimate assets, but $30,000 would still
represent ill-gotten gains. Because licit and illicit funds are not segregated, we
have to assume that twenty-five cents of every dollar paid by Archer Daniels
were illegally obtained. The prohibition against accepting illicit funds would
mean that lawyers could not accept any possibly tainted fees, even if the over-
whelming percentage of the fees was legally earned. In sum, once a lawyer
has reasonable suspicion that a client has ill-gotten gains, the lawyer generally
cannot accept any payment from the client, because at least some of the pay-
ment would represent illicit funds.44
One might critique this argument on the ground that lawyers would be held
to a different ethical standard than other people who might engage in financial
transactions with criminals. If lawyers must worry that some of their fees
might represent the proceeds of criminal activity, why shouldn't grocers or
landlords have similar concerns and be required to refuse payments that might
be tainted in part?45 Indeed, if lawyers cannot accept payment from Archer
Daniels, how can any of the company's suppliers accept payment from the
43 While price-fixing is not the same as theft, it effectively deprives people of their money unlawfully
by making them pay a higher price than they otherwise would have paid.
44 It might be argued that criminal defendants should be able to free up their icit assets by effectively
segregating their legally and illegally-earned dollars. For example, a defendant charged with an economic
crime could put into escrow with the court an amount equal to the amount of allegedly ill-gotten gains and
then use any remaining funds to pay a lawyer. The problem with this suggestion is that we cannot really
know in most cases how much of a criminal's assets are legally obtained. Moreover, once a company or an
individual takes in ill-gotten gains, those gains can be leveraged through legitimate investments or other
uses to produce even more ill-gotten gains. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,559 (1993).
45 For a discussion of the argument that lawyers are treated differently than other people who may en-
gage in transactions with alleged criminals, see Stacy Caplow, Under Advisement: Attorney Fee Forfeiture
and the Supreme Court, 55 BRooK. L. REV. 111, 120 (1989).
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company, and how could any of the company's employees accept their pay-
checks?
There are a few responses to this argument. First, when criminal defense
lawyers accept payment from their clients, the likelihood that tainted funds are
involved is much higher than when another business accepts payment from its
customers. There is no reason for a grocer to think that any particular cus-
tomer is purchasing food with ill-gotten gains any more than there is reason for
a lawyer to think that a client is paying with ill-gotten gains for the defense of
a non-economic crime. Of course, in some circumstances, non-lawyers will
have good reason to believe they are being offered tainted funds, as would
have been the case with suppliers or employees of Archer Daniels once the
company was indicted.46 In such cases, there may be limitations on what non-
lawyers can accept from defendants charged with economic crimes. For ex-
ample, money-laundering laws apply to non-lawyers in the same way that they
do to lawyers. In addition, we often would consider it unethical for non-
lawyers to accept payments from defendants charged with an economic
crime.47 However, there still are good bases for distinguishing lawyers and
non-lawyers in terms of their ethical obligations. I have discussed reasons why
lawyers have ethical obligations that are more stringent than their obligations
under laws of general applicability as well as being more stringent than the
ethical obligations of lay people.8 Indeed, society does not rely on lay people
to enforce the law, nor does it charge them with duties to protect the criminal
justice system from corruption. Lawyers, on the other hand, are officers of the
court with fundamental, professional obligations to ensure that the justice sys-
tem remains untainted.49
Moreover, when lawyers are required to decline possibly tainted funds, the
criminal defendant is not left without a lawyer entirely. Rather, a court-
appointed lawyer is provided for the defendant. In contrast, if employees of
Archer Daniels must decline their paychecks once they have good reason to
suspect their employer of price-fixing, the company does not get government-
provided replacement employees (nor do the employees have any guarantee
that another job will be waiting for them).
46 Even here, lay people are in a different position than are lawyers. The client's lawyer is in a much
better position than is a lay person to judge the soundness of the charges.
47 For example, a car dealer would violate moral norms by knowingly accepting the proceeds of a bank
robbery as payment for an automobile.
48 See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNuCr Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1983).
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This distinction between criminal defense and other services leads to a
further point. If it is true that a lawyer could not accept a fee to represent
Archer Daniels Midland on its price-fixing charges, does that mean that law-
yers cannot accept fees to represent companies in civil matters if the company
may have committed an unrelated economic crime? For example, while the
federal government was pursuing its antitrust charges against Archer Daniels,
should lawyers have declined to represent Archer Daniels in all of its civil
cases? Archer Daniels, after all, would be using the same funds for civil repre-
sentation as for criminal representation.
The civil attorney can be distinguished from the criminal lawyer because
there is no right to counsel on civil matters. If Archer Daniels were prohibited
from using any of its money to secure civil counsel, the company would be left
entirely without the ability to secure legal representation on civil matters.
Moreover, while it is fair in prosecutions for economic crimes to hold defense
counsel responsible for recognizing that their fees come in part from the
charged crime, civil counsel often are not in a very good position to know
when their fees might come in part from criminal misconduct.50
C. The Obligation to Decline All Ill-Gotten Gains
Until now, I have considered whether lawyers can accept fees from funds
that might rightly belong to someone else. A lawyer defending a bank robber
might be paid out of the bank's funds; a lawyer defending a price-fixing com-
pany might be paid out of funds generated by price-gouging, that is, funds that
should be rebated to all of the company's customers who paid higher prices
than they should have paid. But what if the defendant's illegally obtained
money does not really belong to someone else? Should the analysis change
when the defendant has committed an economic crime but has not really de-
prived other persons of their property? For example, assume the defendant
was charged with selling cocaine or heroin. The defendant is not entitled to
the proceeds of the drug sales, but neither are the defendant's customers. They
presumably got what they paid for.
50 One might also ask whether lawyers should forever be barred from accepting fees from Archer Dan-
iels for representation on criminal matters. If some illicit gains taint all of the company's assets, when could
a criminal defense lawyer ever assume that a fee from Archer Daniels was not tainted? For the most part,
once criminal proceedings have been completed, one could assume that the taint has been lifted. As part of
any conviction, the government will try to recover the illicit gains. Indeed, as mentioned, Archer Daniels
paid a $100 million fine after pleading guilty to its price-fixing charges. See supra note 36. However, if a
subsequent criminal proceeding involved charges of economic crime, any fees paid by Archer Daniels would
be tainted by the subsequent crime.
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Although stolen property laws cannot reach attorneys' fees paid by drug
dealers, there are other laws that apply in the same way. Moreover, even
though the ethical considerations are not exactly the same as with receiving
stolen property, there is more than enough ethical concern to justify a rule un-
der which lawyers would have to decline fees from defendants charged with
drug dealing or other economic crimes that do not involve stolen property.
First, when I discussed the ethical and legal obstacles to accepting fees
from bank robbers, I observed that lawyers may not accept stolen property
from their clients. This prohibition is an example of the larger principle that
lawyers may not accept the fruits or instrumentalities of criminal activity from
their clients.5' This principle, which has both ethical and legal force, does not
distinguish the "fruits" of criminal activity according to whether they rightly
belong to someone else. Rather, lawyers may not accept any proceeds of
criminal activity, and they may not do so because (a) they would facilitate the
defendant's criminal activity by giving the defendant a place to use the ill-
gotten gains, (b) they would be trafficking in contraband and (c) they would
help the defendant conceal evidence of the crime.5
A second problem with a lawyer's accepting the proceeds of drug dealing
or other criminal activity is that the proceeds effectively belong to the govern-
ment. Asset forfeiture statutes turn the profits of criminal activity into the
government's property, and title to the profits actually vests in the government
at the time the profits are earned.53 Lawyers who accept the proceeds of crimi-
nal activity, then, effectively are stealing from the government.
Third, accepting proceeds of criminal activity would often put the lawyer
in violation of ethical and legal prohibitions against money laundering. I have
discussed a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which governs monetary trans-
actions involving the proceeds of a broad range of criminal activities.m That
statute makes it a felony to engage in monetary transactions involving property
51 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.6:401-02, at 193-198.3, § 1.6:405, at 210-13.
52 See id.; see also HAZARD Er At., supra note 12, at 49-50.
53 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989) (discussing the effects of
the asset forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1982)). Commentators have criticized the statutory vest-
ing of assets as a legal fiction. See Winick, supra note 1, at 816-817. However, if one takes the view that
property ownership constitutes a bundle of rights that is decided by the government in the first place, then
government restrictions on property used in crime are no more a legal fiction than is any other rule of prop-
erty rights. See MARc L. MmLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRBIINAL IROCEDURs: CASES, STATUrEs, AND
EXECuTtvMATMEtLjLs 1179 (1998).
54 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48
1999] REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS ON CHARGES OF ECONOMIC CRIME
derived from criminal activities when the value of the property is greater than
$10,000. 55 Money laundering statutes do not distinguish between ill-gotten
gains that belong to someone else, as with the proceeds of a bank robbery, and
ill-gotten gains that do not belong to another person, as with the proceeds of
drug sales. 6  Lawyers who take ill-gotten gains effectively are laundering
money.
11. THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS Do NOT JUSTIFY THE
ACCEPTANCE OF TAINTED FUNDS BY LAWYERS
To this point, I have argued from basic principles of ethics and law that
lawyers may not accept fees from defendants charged with an economic crime
once the lawyer has reasonable suspicion of the client's guilt. As with other
issues in ethics or law, there is another side to the issue. Other commentators
have advanced arguments in favor of permitting lawyers to accept possibly
tainted funds.57 While these are important arguments, I believe that they are
ultimately unpersuasive.
In response to the ethical and legal concerns that arise when lawyers take
payment from possibly tainted funds, many commentators cite the important
social goal of ensuring that defendants are not convicted unless they have been
given effective legal representation.58 If defendants charged with economic
crimes find it too difficult to obtain good legal services, society must worry
that many people will be convicted for lack of competent legal representation
rather than because they deserve incarceration. Our adversarial system of jus-
tice is based on the idea that a fair outcome will result from the vigorous ef-
forts of opposing counsel. Accordingly, we do not want lawyers to disqualify
themselves too readily when they are asked to represent a defendant charged
with an economic crime.
55 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1996). For a discussion of § 1957, see D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally
Derived Property Statute: Constitutional and Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C. § 1957, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1291 (1993); G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 149 (1989); Alan J. Jacobs, Note, Indirect Deprivation of the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The
Prospective Prosecution of Criminal Defense Attorneys for "Money Laundering," 34 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
303 (1989).
56 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1996) (covering, among other crimes, bank theft, smuggling and drug
distribution). For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of money laundering and lawyers, see Eugene
R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43 SYRACusEL. REv. 1165 (1992).
57 See Cloud, supra note 17, at 831-35; Winick, supra note 1, at 839-69.
58 See Cloud, supra note 1, at 35-65; Winick, supra note 1, at 777-84.
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How should we balance conflicting social goals in answering the question
of when a lawyer should decline fees because the money may have been ob-
tained illicitly? In Section A of this Part, I will present arguments for permit-
ting attorneys to accept tainted funds. In Section B, I will explain why these
arguments are not persuasive.
A. Arguments in Favor of Permitting Criminal Defendants to Pay Their Legal
Fees with Ill-Gotten Gains
If lawyers may not accept a defendant's payment, the defendant's constitu-
tional rights to counsel and to due process arguably are implicated. To be sure,
there need not be state action when members of the private bar individually or
collectively decide to forgo certain kinds of representation on ethical grounds.
However, because legal codes of professional responsibility have become a
matter of state law in this country, 9 it is important to consider whether it would
be constitutional for a state to amend its ethics code to prohibit lawyers from
accepting possibly tainted fees. Moreover, even if there are no violations of
constitutional rights, the same concerns underlying the constitutional claims
would constitute important policy arguments in favor of permitting defendants
to pay their legal fees with ill-gotten gains.
Commentators have claimed that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
right to counsel ° would be violated if defendants could not use their financial
assets to hire a lawyer. Similarly, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guar-
antee due process, and that right arguably is infringed if defendants are rele-
gated to a court-appointed lawyer instead of a privately-paid attorney. For
analysis of the right to counsel and due process implications of ethical rules
prohibiting lawyers from accepting tainted fees, one can turn to a related issue:
the authority of the government to seize attorneys' fees under asset forfeiture
laws. These laws permit law enforcement officials to seize property that repre-
sents a fruit or instrumentality of criminal activity.6'
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, scholars pursued a lively debate about the constitutionality of
59 See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE
PROFESSION 8-11 (1996).
60 The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1996); Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable
Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. Sct. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994).
62 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
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government decisions to seize attorneys' fees under asset forfeiture laws. 63
The Supreme Court settled the matter when it unequivocally upheld the con-
stitutionality of such seizures. Still, one might question whether the Court was
correct. If the Court's rationale is unsound, one might hesitate to move from a
regime in which attorneys' fees might be seized to a regime in which they
could not be accepted in the first place.6M
Accordingly, let us now turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Caplin &
Drysdale. In that case, an alleged drug kingpin was charged with engaging in
a "continuing criminal enterprise" in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.65 As part of
the proceedings against the defendant, the court issued a restraining order for-
bidding the transfer of any forfeitable assets. This order prevented the defen-
dant from paying his legal fees, so his law firm, Caplin & Drysdale, challenged
the order as violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.6 The
firm also pressed a due process claim, arguing that seizures of attorneys' fees
upset the balance of power between the prosecutor and defendant.
In support of its Sixth Amendment claim, Caplin & Drysdale cited the in-
dividual's "right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney," 67 but
the Court responded that this right exists only as far as the defendant can af-
ford. Indigent defendants cannot choose which public defenders will represent
them; they must accept the attorneys appointed for them by the court.& The
63 See, e.g., Symposium Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relationship, 36 EMORY LJ.
755 (1987).
64 For useful discussions of civil forfeiture laws beyond the context of attorneys' fees, see LEONARD W.
LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FoRFErruRE OF PRoPERTY (1996); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing
for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 35 (1998); Symposium: Federal
Asset Forfeiture Reform, 21 J. LEGIS. 155 (1995); Symposium: What Price Civil Forfeiture? Constitutional
Implications and Reform Initiatives, 39 N.Y.L. ScHi. L. REv. 1 (1994).
65 According to the statute, "Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up to life impris-
onment." 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1996). If defendants have been previously convicted under the statute, they
face a substantial fine and stiffer penalties. See id.
A person is engaged in a "continuing criminal enterprise" when the person (1) is part of a group of six
or more persons that perpetrates a series of criminal violations, (2) assumes a managerial, organizational or
supervisory position in the group and (3) "obtains substantial income or resources" from the group's crimi-
na activities. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1996).
66 Although there appeared to be a standing problem with the law firm's assertion of the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel, the Court observed that the law firm's stake in the forfeited assets satisfied
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article Il. In addition, the special nature of the attorney-client relationship
and the impact of the litigation on the interests of the third-party law firm counseled against rejection of
standing on prudential grounds. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3.
67 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
(' See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624.
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right to choose one's attorney, in short, means only that defendants can
"'spend [their] own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... coun-
sel."'6 This makes a good deal of sense. People need food, clothing and
shelter to survive, but we do not therefore permit them to use stolen money to
purchase those goods. As to the fact that the defendant's constitutional right to
counsel was implicated by the seizure of assets, the Court noted that asset sei-
zures interfere with the exercise of multiple fundamental rights, including the
right to speak, to practice one's religion and to travel.7° Nevertheless, asset
forfeitures still are permitted.
The Court quickly dispensed with the argument that seizures of attorneys'
fees would upset the balance of power between prosecutors and defendants.
The Court reasoned that the due process clause's guarantee of a fair trial oper-
ates primarily through the protections of the Sixth Amendment, and the Court
had already found the Sixth Amendment challenge unavailing.7 Further, to
make out a claim of unfair prosecutorial tactics under the due process clause,
defendants must show prosecutorial misconduct or the implementation of a
rule that is "inherently unconstitutional," and neither criterion was present in
72the case.
The dissent in Caplin & Drysdale, which was decided by a 5-4 margin, in-
voked several important policy concerns to justify a Sixth Amendment prohi-
bition on the seizure of assets used for legal fees. First, the dissenters observed
that if defendants are forced, through loss of their assets, to accept court-
appointed lawyers, the government will have compromised the effectiveness of
the lawyer-client relationship.73 Lawyers can function as truly effective advo-
cates only if they enjoy the full trust of their clients, and criminal defendants
have good reason to distrust lawyers who are appointed and paid by the gov-
ernment, which is their adversary.74
The dissent also invoked the concern about maintaining a fair balance be-
tween prosecutors and defendants. Citing Bruce Winick's discussion,"5 the
69 Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (quoting Waiters v. National Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
70 Id. at 628.
71 Id at 633.
72 Id. at 634.
73 Id at 644 (Blaclumm, J., dissenting).74 Id. at 645.
75 Winiek, supra note 1, at 779-84; see also Caplow, supra note 45, at 128-29; William J. Genego, The
Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 36 EMORY LJ. 837, 842-43 (1987).
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dissent noted that not only would criminal defendants be precluded from hiring
skilled lawyers if attorneys' fees could be seized, but over the long-term, the
diminished opportunity for compensation would drive talented lawyers away
from criminal law.76
Finally, the dissent found that seizures of attorneys' fees would result in the
"virtual socialization of criminal defense work," as defendants would be forced
to accept public defenders or other court-appointed counsel.77 Such a sociali-
zation would result in a standardization of criminal defense services by elimi-
nating the "maverick and the risk taker" whose advocacy styles might not fit
into the "structured environment of a public defender's office."78 In addition,
the criminal defense bar would lose much of its independence from the gov-
ernment, as judges could decline to appoint counsel whom they did not like.79
Although the dissent did not prevail in its argument, it invoked some very
important arguments in favor of permitting defendants to use the proceeds of
their criminal activity for legal fees. Our adversarial system is premised on the
idea of justice emerging from the efforts of vigorous advocates on both sides
of a case. If criminal defendants are prevented from securing the assistance of
the best defense lawyers, we must wonder whether convictions reflect justice
or simply the greater resources of the government. 0 Moreover, if criminal de-
fense lawyers are increasingly paid by the government, we must wonder
whether the attorneys are sufficiently independent of their clients' adversary.
Accordingly, even if there are no constitutional barriers to stricter standards for
accepting fees from clients charged with economic crime, we might conclude
that it would be bad policy to adopt stricter standards. In the next section, I
will consider this policy question and conclude that, on policy grounds, crimi-
nal defense lawyers should not accept possibly tainted fees from their clients.
B. Reasons for Rejecting the Arguments in Favor of Permitting Lawyers to
Accept Possibly Tainted Fees from Criminal Defendants
For several reasons, the arguments in favor of permitting lawyers to accept
possibly tainted fees ultimately are unpersuasive.
76 See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 646-647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 647.
78 id.
79 See id.
go See Lisa Rackner, Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Consti-
tutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 124, 146-148 (1986) (discussing the threat to the
adversary system from seizures of attorneys' fees under asset forfeiture laws).
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1. Illegitimate Means
The arguments presented above presume that the benefits of having defen-
dants receive a strong legal defense will overcome the ethical concerns with
lawyers accepting tainted funds. However, it is problematic to suggest that
good consequences can justify conduct that is inherently unethical. Permitting
lawyers to accept ill-gotten gains so that defendants have a better legal defense
entails the morally problematic course of encouraging illegitimate means to a
desirable end. The acceptability of a practice does not depend simply on
whether it produces more gains than losses on balance."s Rather, conduct vio-
lating an important moral principle should be condemned, even if the conduct
might lead to some beneficial consequences. It is morally wrong for lawyers
to traffic in ill-gotten gains, and the moral wrongness persists even when the
important interests of criminal defendants in obtaining good legal counsel are
implicated.
To put it another way, if the argument in favor of allowing tainted fees
turns on notions of justice, then the argument runs afoul of itself, for the 'just"
outcome is reached only by an unjust process: the hiring of lawyers with
tainted dollars. Lawyers are officers of the court as well as advocates for their
clients. It is wrong for anyone to traffic in illicit funds, but it is especially
wrong for those who have a professional obligation to uphold the law. People
should not be able to steal their way to a highly skilled lawyer. If criminals
can use ill-gotten gains to pay their attorneys, we end up with the rather per-
verse result that the more successful the criminal, the better the legal defense.
The simple bungler would be relegated to a public defender while the person
tripped up only after years of law breaking could afford the most talented law-
yers.
If we consider other ethical obligations of lawyers, we see that potentially
good consequences cannot override important moral principles. For example,
just as lawyers must not traffic in ill-gotten gains, they also must not lie or
present false testimony on behalf of their clients.r2 Yet, there might be times in
which false testimony would result in a more just outcome. Suppose, for
81 One could say that morally wrong acts produce bad consequences by virtue of their immorality and
that the bad consequences always outweigh the good consequences. However, I am referring instead to the
deontological view that we should judge the rightness or wrongness of conduct on grounds other than the
consequences produced. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETiCS 56 (4th ed. 1994).
82 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUct Rule 3.4(b) ("A lawyer shall not falsify evidence,
counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely ..... ) (1983).
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example, that person V (victim) was accosted while walking down a quiet
street at night, dragged into an alley and then robbed and beaten. Person W
(witness), who lives on the street, will correctly identify person B (bystander)
as having walked away from the scene of the crime around the time of the
crime. Because of W's identification of B, and the fact that B is roughly the
same height and weight as the assailant (according to V's testimony),83 B's
lawyer thinks it very likely that a jury would convict B even though B had
nothing to do with the crime. B just happened to be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. On the other hand, B can produce a fairly convincing alibi, which
would likely ensure an acquittal, but the lawyer knows the alibi to be false.
Can the lawyer put B on the stand to testify to the false alibi?m Principles of
ethical responsibility and perjury law say no." The prohibitions on false
testimony do not include exceptions for lies that result in better consequences
than would the truth. Even though B's lie would lead to a more just verdict, it
is not permissible for the lawyer to participate in the lie.86
In sum, as a general matter, the potential for good consequences cannot
override a lawyer's obligation to maintain professional integrity. Accordingly,
the interest in better legal representation for criminal defendants cannot excuse
the practice of lawyers accepting tainted funds from their clients.
2. Balancing the Conflicting Interests
Even under a more consequentialist view that would permit a balancing of
benefits and costs, we still should deny criminal defense lawyers the freedom
to receive ill-gotten gains from their clients. As I will demonstrate, the
83 V is unable, however, to recall enough about the assailant to determine whether B was the culprit.
84 This example is a modified version of a hypothetical presented in MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs'
ETmcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 30-31 (1975), and in Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75 (1966).
85 See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 3.3:204, at 589 (Supp. 1991) (observing that the lawyer's
ethical duty not to lie under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is not qualified in any way; it flatly
prohibits a lawyer from "offering" evidence she "knows" to be false); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in
Criminal Cases: Still in Search of An Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 521, 523-25 (1988). But see
FREEDMAN, supra note 84, at 31 (arguing that, while the lawyer must warn the client that the proposed tes-
timony is unlawful, the lawyer should let the client testify so as not to violate the professional duty of confi-
dentiality); Freedman, supra note 84, at 1475.
86 One might distinguish subornation of perjury from the acceptance of tainted fees on the ground that
the fees are external to the judicial process. Perjury directly undermines the court's proceedings while
tainted fees do not affect the integrity of thejury's decision. The problem with this distinction is that it rests
on a limited view of the system at stake. If one considers the entire criminal justice system, then both sub-
ornation of perjury and laundering of criminal proceeds by lawyers are internal to the system.
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arguments in favor of permitting tainted fees can be countered with equally
persuasive arguments against the acceptance of such fees. In the end, one
cannot say with any confidence that, on balance, the criminal justice system or
criminal defendants will be better served if lawyers can accept illicit funds
from their clients. To be sure, one also cannot say with certainty that the
criminal justice system or criminal defendants will be disserved. However, in
the face of such indeterminacy, society must come down against possibly
tainted fees. Because it is not clear that there would be good consequences if
lawyers could accept the fees, there is not a sufficient basis for overcoming the
important ethical concerns raised when lawyers take ill-gotten gains from their
clients. That is, before society overrides an important ethical principle by
citing countervailing benefits from an override, it should have stronger
evidence that the benefits would in fact materialize.
Allowing lawyers to accept possibly tainted fees may well not result in
benefits for either criminal defendants or the criminal justice system. The ar-
gument for permitting tainted fees proceeds as follows: Our adversarial system
is premised on the idea that just verdicts result from the vigorous clash of op-
posing counsel. If defendants charged with economic crimes are unable to se-
cure private counsel, their representation will suffer, and one must wonder
whether convictions result from guilt or from inadequate representation. How-
ever, several considerations cast doubt on the proposition that the criminal jus-
tice system will suffer if lawyers are prohibited from accepting possibly tainted
fees.
First, it is not at all clear that criminal defendants fare better with private
lawyers than with court-appointed counsel. Surprisingly, the majority of
studies on the issue show no difference between privately-retained counsel and
public defenders or other court-appointed lawyers. The quality of service
appears to be roughly similar, as do the results of the representation.88
Whether defendants have privately or publicly paid counsel seems to have
little effect on the severity of charges for which the defendant is convicted
(e.g., felony vs. misdemeanor), on the type of punishment (e.g., no
incarceration vs. incarceration) or the probable length of incarceration
87 See Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel:
Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RuTGERS LJ. 361, 365-78, 407-08 (1991). To be
sure, if resources for a defendant's representation fall below a minimal level of adequacy, then the quality of
the representation will be seriously compromised. See i. at 406-07.
88 See id.
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(measured by the number of months typically served for the sentence
imposed). 89
Second, even assuming that defendants receive a weaker defense from
court-appointed counsel, it does not follow that the criminal justice system will
be worse if more criminal defendants must rely on court-appointed lawyers. It
might be true that more defendants would receive a suboptimal legal defense
and that, therefore, the adversarial system would not work as designed. How-
ever, we need to consider other benefits and costs to the justice system. If
criminals can use their ill-gotten gains for lawyers' fees, then people have a
greater incentive to commit crimes. The drug dealer, the bank robber and the
organized crime boss will discount the likelihood of being caught and con-
victed by the likelihood that a first-rate lawyer will be able to win an acquit-
tal.90 The availability of outstanding legal counsel will be especially important
for people who contemplate the complicated financial crimes for which highly-
paid lawyers are supposed to be especially important.9 Knowing that antitrust
violations or securities frauds often are difficult to prove,9 potential perpetra-
tors of those crimes will take a good deal of comfort if they know they can turn
to blue-chip lawyers to argue their defense.
Third, forcing every perpetrator of an economic crime to rely on court-
appointed lawyers actually may serve the interests of both criminal defendants
and society. In large part, what seems like a real conflict between the ethical
concerns from tainted fees and the legal needs of criminal defendants may be
only a false conflict. It is quite possible that preventing lawyers from accept-
ing any proceeds of criminal activity will not have nearly the dire effects that
are predicted. Indeed, criminal defendants as a group might benefit if lawyers
were held to a fairly strict standard when it comes to accepting potentially
tainted funds. As more criminal defendants are forced to accept court-
appointed lawyers, we can expect a strengthening rather than a weakening of
89 See Robert V. Stover & Dennis R. Eckart, A Systematic Comparison of Public Defenders and Private
Attorneys, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 265, 284-300 (1975) (reporting results from a comparison of private attorneys
and public defenders in a major city in 1972).
90 In other words, if one believes that the threat of conviction deters crime, the deterrence is strength-
ened if potential criminals realize that they cannot turn to high-priced lawyers to secure an acquittal. See
Michael J. Sharp, Comment, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States: The Supreme Court's Decision
that Crime Doesn't Pay-Even for Attorneys' Fees!, 24 GA. L. REV. 137, 154 (1989). But see Rackner, su-
pra note 80, at 139; Winick, supra note 1, at 836.
91 See Cloud, supra note 1, at 35-38; Winick, supra note 1, at 773-75.
92 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANrrrRusT LAW: AN ECOMONIC PERSPE 232 (1976) (discuss-
ing the "enormous cost of antitrust proceedings" because of the complex economic issues involved).
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the public lawyering system. To see why this is so, this Article will look more
closely at the argument in favor of permitting lawyers to accept payments from
clients charged with economic crimes.
The usual argument in favor of permitting lawyers to accept possibly
tainted fees rests largely on the assumption of a static criminal justice system.
If more criminal defendants must go to public defenders or other court-
appointed lawyers, the quality of free legal representation will decline, given
the already overly-stretched system of court-appointed counsel. As it is, these
lawyers are underpaid and overworked and therefore cannot mount the sophis-
ticated legal defense that can be provided by well-compensated defense law-
yers.93 In other words, if the criminal justice system as currently structured
cannot properly handle every indigent defendant, how could it handle even
more defendants needing court-appointed counsel?
However, it is incorrect to assume that the structure of the criminal justice
system will remain unchanged if we restrict the freedom of private lawyers to
accept fees from defendants charged with economic crimes. Like other sys-
tems, the criminal justice system is a dynamic one; its structure is determined
in large part by external conditions. Failure to consider the implications of a
change in policy from a dynamic perspective can lead to seriously inaccurate
analyses. Consider the following example from consumer shopping to demon-
strate how real-world systems operate dynamically rather than statically. If the
price of beef increases, people will consume fewer steaks and roasts, but their
standard of living will not drop as much as might be expected by looking just
at the price increase and the amount of beef currently purchased. This is be-
cause the price increase will encourage individuals not only to buy less beef
but also to substitute less expensive, alternative sources of animal protein in
their diet. Increases in poultry and pork consumption will offset some or all of
the decrease in beef consumption, and people may end up eating as much ani-
mal protein as they did before the price increase.94 Or, assume that concerns
about cholesterol lead consumers to prefer more fish in their diet. In the short
93 See RiCHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERo, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE INDIGENT
DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defend-
ers and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1994). Indeed,
it is widely assumed that O.J. Simpson's acquittal on murder charges would not have occurred without his
talented team of lawyers, DNA experts and other support. Simpson's 10-person team of lawyers sent him
bills for his defense that were estimated at $3-6 million. See Richard Price et al., O.J.'s Finances May be
Next Twist, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 1997, at 3A.
94 See Louis Uchitelle, The Budget Battle: The Calculations; The Negotiators Forgo A Cut in Inflation
Index, N.Y. TImES, May 3, 1997, at 12.
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run, the price of fish will increase as people bid up the price of the fish supply.
Over the long run, however, companies will respond to the increase in demand
by sending more boats out to fish or by opening fish farms to increase the fish
supply. This increase in supply will drive the price of fish back down again.
Similarly, if more criminal defendants will need court-appointed lawyers, the
public lawyering system will immediately become overstretched, but the sys-
tem will change in response to the greater demands placed upon it. Legisla-
tures will allocate more funds to pay for court-appointed lawyers.
To be sure, the public lawyering system might not change that much in re-
sponse to its greater demands. If more drug dealers end up in public defend-
ers' offices, the offices probably will get more lawyers, but not necessarily in
proportion to the increase in client base. The effects would be much like what
has happened with prisons as the prison population has mushroomed in this
country. We do have more prisons and prisoners now than we did 20 years
ago-roughly 1500 prisons with 1,250,000 prisoners in 1997 versus 655 pris-
ons with 280,000 prisoners in 1977-but we also have more overcrowding of
prison cells than we used to tolerate. In 1977, prisons operated at six to eight
percent above capacity, and by 1997, the prison population was fifteen to
twenty-four percent above capacity. 5 If tougher rules on the acceptance of
attorneys' fees affected the criminal justice in the way that tougher sentencing
has affected the penal system, the critics of attorneys' fee forfeitures would be
on solid ground. Making it harder for lawyers to accept fees in cases involving
economic crimes would only worsen the ability of criminal defendants to se-
cure effective legal counsel.
However, there is good reason to think that tougher rules on attorneys' fees
would have a positive effect on the quality of legal representation of defen-
dants charged with economic crimes. The key to a positive effect lies in
adopting rules on attorneys' fees that are very strict. Indeed, the stricter the
rules, the more positive the effect. As discussed above, this effect is an impli-
cation of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance.9
95 There is a range in the measurements of overcapacity because there are different ways to measure a
prison's capacity. Capacity can be measured in terms of the institution's architectural plan (design capac-
ity), in terms of what a rating official determines (rated capacity) or in terms of a prison's existing facilities,
staff and services (operational capacity). Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Prison
Statistics (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http:lwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/prisons.htm> (basing the number of prisons
in 1997 on estimates from 1995 data).
96 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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As a prelude to my argument, recall that there are two ways in which
stricter ethical rules could make it more difficult for lawyers to accept fees
from defendants charged with economic crime. First, society can lower the
lawyer's required threshold of suspicion that the defendant is actually guilty of
the crime charged. We could state that attorneys must decline payment once
they have good reason, or "probable cause," to think that the defendant is
guilty. Second, we can require lawyers to decline fees if any of their clients'
assets might have been earned through illicit activity. Or, to put the two
standards together, we could require lawyers to refuse a proffered fee if they
have good reason to believe that some of the defendant's assets were illegally
obtained.
Changing the standards in these ways would have two important effects.
First, it would immediately broaden the pool of defendants who would need a
public defender or other court-appointed lawyer. Lawyers would have to de-
cline a greater proportion of tendered fees. Indeed, in almost all cases of al-
leged economic- crime, lawyers would not be able to represent the defendants
for a fee. Because prosecutors must meet a probable cause standard to file
charges, lawyers virtually always would have good reason to suspect that their
clients were guilty of the government's charges. Moreover, because people
mingle their assets freely, the lawyer would have to assume that at least some
of the payment would come from the ill-gotten gains.
The second effect a change in standards would impose is the more impor-
tant one. Not only would there be a substantial increase in the pool of defen-
dants needing court-appointed lawyers, there also would be an immediate
change in the demographics of defendants needing court-appointed lawyers.
The pool of defendants would pick up not only the bank robber and the drug
dealer with no visible means of legal income, but also Wall Street financiers
charged with insider trading, corporate executives charged with price-fixing
and physicians charged with Medicare fraud. These criminal defendants now
can hire their own lawyers because they likely have sufficient funds from licit
activities to afford even the highest-priced legal talent. However, if lawyers
had to assume that the profits from insider trading, price-fixing or Medicare
fraud will be used to pay at least part of the legal bill, and lawyers were pro-
hibited from accepting any tainted funds from their clients, then white collar
criminal defendants would have to turn to court-appointed lawyers for their le-
gal defense.
[Vol. 48
1999] REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS ON CHARGES OF ECONOMIC CRIME 1369
Such a change in the demographics of the clientele of court-appointed law-
yers could have a profound effect on the criminal justice system. Currently,
there is relatively lukewarm support for well-funded public defender programs
because the system has a politically weak constituency.97 Most people with
wealth and political influence do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the
public lawyering system and therefore have little reason to call for greater
funding of the system. Indeed, they are much more likely to support govern-
ment programs that more directly benefit them. In other words, with respect to
the public lawyering system, people with political influence can peek beyond
the Rawlsian veil of ignorance and see that they will not need the services of
court-appointed lawyers. On the other hand, the people who do see them-
selves as potential beneficiaries of the public lawyering system are likely to be
poor and lacking in political influence.
If, however, anyone charged with an economic crime is likely to require a
court-appointed lawyer, then the political calculus looks very different. Sud-
denly, anyone at risk for "white-collar" criminal prosecution is at risk for
needing a court-appointed lawyer. Suddenly, the pool of potential beneficiar-
ies of the public defender program includes physicians and hospital directors
who find themselves on the wrong end of a Medicare fraud prosecution; com-
pany presidents, accountants and lawyers who find themselves on the wrong
end of a securities fraud prosecution; or corporate officers who find themselves
on the wrong end of an antitrust or environmental pollution prosecution. Sud-
denly, the constituency for a strong public lawyering system has a great deal
more wealth and political influence, and we can expect legislators to respond
to the change in constituency when they vote for funding for public defenders
and other court-appointed lawyers. In other words, if society changes the
standards requiring attorneys to reject fees that might be tainted, it puts more
people of wealth and political influence behind the Rawlsian veil with respect
to the question whether they will need a court-appointed lawyer at some future
time. This positive effect on funding for court-appointed lawyers grows as we
adopt ever stricter standards. The stricter the standards, the more society
broadens the demographics of the clients of court-appointed lawyers.98
97 See Norman Lefstein, Keynote Address, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 10-11 (1986); Su-
zanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation,
1982 WIs. L. REv. 473, 481-83; Charles . Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on The New Public Defender for the 21st
Century, 58(1) LAW& COMTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995).
98 It might be argued that I have overstated the change in incentives for a stronger public-lawyering
system. Even if corporate officers, physicians, lawyers and accountants recognize that they will be sent to a
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To put it another way, stricter standards will lead to a system of criminal
defense representation in which the fortunes of the indigent are linked more
closely to the fortunes of the well-to-do. Under current conditions, politically
influential persons have little to gain personally from a strong public lawyering
system. In their view, a strong system would require that they pay higher taxes
and/or receive fewer benefits from other programs that affect their interests
more directly. Moreover, under current conditions, politically influential per-
sons likely would see a strong public lawyering system as putting themselves
at greater risk from criminal threats. If court-appointed lawyers have more re-
sources and better legal skills, they may frustrate efforts of prosecutors to con-
vict and incarcerate lawbreakers. Under conditions with stricter professional
standards, on the other hand, politically influential persons would have more to
gain from a strong public lawyering system. They or their friends might well
need court-appointed counsel someday, so a strong public lawyering system
would be seen more as a safeguard against government overreaching than as a
protector of criminals.
The enhanced constituency for a strong public lawyering program also
would help address a related concern with rules that would drive criminal
defendants to court-appointed counsel. Critics of attorney fee seizures under
asset forfeiture laws have observed that court-appointed lawyers may be
adequate for garden-variety criminal cases but contend that the lawyers lack
the time and resources necessary to present an effective defense in complicated
cases, like federal racketeering (or RICO) prosecutions." This is an important
concern, but it demonstrates again the benefits of broadening rather than
narrowing the situations in which lawyers decline possibly tainted fees. If
lawyers decline fees in a wide range of circumstances, and politically
influential persons begin to see a strong public lawyering program as being in
their interest, people with political power also will support adequate funding
for complex cases. Indeed, they may be especially concerned about such
funding because the expanded constituency would include individuals at risk
for antitrust violations and other complex, white collar crime. Here again the
public defender if criminal charges are brought, they may believe that they are so unlikely ever to be charged
with an economic crime that they will not need a criminal defense lawyer.
I have two responses to this argument First, because the stakes are so high with criminal prosecu-
tions, the likelihood of being charged can be very low and still provoke considerable concern. More impor-
tantly, even if the politically powerful do not initially see themselves at much risk of criminal prosecution,
the first time a company like Archer Daniels is sent to a public defender, Congress will be under tremendous
pressure to increase funding for the public lawyering system.
99 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1996); Cloud, supra note 1, at 46-49; Morgan, supra note 9, at 759.
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public lawyering system improves if we ensure that the system serves more
than the disenfranchised members of society.
There is a useful analogy to other public benefit programs. Programs like
Social Security and Medicare have been fairly successful in meeting the needs
of the poor because they cover everyone, rich or poor. The more prosperous
beneficiaries can protect their stake in the programs only if they also protect
the stake of the poor. Other programs, like public housing and Medicaid, have
been less successful because they cover only the indigent and suffer from their
beneficiaries' lack of political power. When the well-to-do vote against
increased funding for public housing or Medicaid, they are not harming their
own interests. Indeed, they are serving their own economic interests by
preventing the redistribution of their wealth.
At this point, my argument for stricter professional standards with respect
to accepting fees from clients dovetails with an important argument for a more
egalitarian criminal justice system. Even aside from concerns about lawyers
accepting fees from the profits of criminal activity, there are good reasons to
support a criminal justice system in which all defendants rely on court-
appointed lawyers. As Leroy Clark has argued, all defendants, regardless of
their wealth, should be treated equally before the law, but equal treatment can-
not be a reality when some defendants are able to spend millions of dollars on
the highest quality legal representation, and other defendants must rely on the
few-thousand-dollar budgets of court-appointed lawyers.' °1 In addition, public
confidence in the criminal justice system suffers when it appears that a defen-
dant's likelihood of acquittal can turn on the defendant's wealth rather than on
the defendant's actual guilt aloneir2
My argument also serves a second important egalitarian goal for the
criminal justice system. When the federal government invokes asset forfeiture
laws to capture attorneys' fees, it does not do so in a way that treats all
1OO See David Orenticher, Affirmative Action and Texas' Ten Percent Solution: Improving Diversity and
Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 192 (1998). For additional arguments discussing the advantages of
social programs that apply broadly, see THmDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATEs: FTURE
PossmmrTs IN HISomcAL PERsPECrrvE 250-274 (1995); WILL Am JuLIus WILSON, THm TRULY DIs-
ADVANTAGED: THE INNER CrrY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PuBLic POLICY 118-24 (1987).
101 Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases:
The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 47, 47-52 (1997). See also Alan Wertheimer, The
Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 303 (1988) (arguing for equal access to counsel for
civil litigants).
102 See Clark, supra note 101.
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criminal defendants equally. Attorneys' fees for certain types of criminals,
like drug dealers and members of organized crime, are frequent targets of asset
forfeitures.E Attorneys' fees for perpetrators of securities or Medicare fraud
are much less frequently targeted. Indeed, the same bias occurs with respect to
other kinds of asset forfeitures. Prosecutors are quite willing to seize the real
property of drug dealers, but rarely, if ever, will they seize the business
facilities of colporate defendants.0 4 Tightening the ethical standards for
lawyers regarding fees from potentially tainted funds would make it more
likely for corporate executives to be treated the same way as drug dealers in
terms of their ability to secure legal counsel.
In closing this section, I will reemphasize an earlier point. Criminal
defendants and the criminal justice system may in fact be worse off if we drive
more defendants to court-appointed lawyers by restricting the freedom of
lawyers to accept possibly tainted fees. It may be that criminal defendants fare
much better with privately-paid counsel than the empirical studies suggest;105 it
may be that the ability to use ill-gotten gains to pay lawyers does not entice
many people to commit crimes they otherwise would not commit; °e and it may
be that a broadened constituency for the public lawyering system will not
result in a strengthening of the system't0 However, all of these possibilities
cast substantial doubt on the argument that, if society employs strict ethical
standards for attorneys' fees from clients charged with economic crimes, there
will be serious consequences for the criminal justice system. Because that
argument is highly questionable, there is not a sufficient basis for overriding
103 This bias reflects in part the way asset forfeiture laws are implemented. It also reflects the fact that
asset forfeiture laws are drafted to target some crimes more than others. Indeed, contemporary asset forfei-
ture laws were passed "to create 'a powerful weapon in the fight against drug trafficking and racketeering."'
Cloud, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting S. REP. No. 225-98, at 194 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3374). The U.S. Department of Justice's focus on asset forfeiture in drug trafficking cases is illustrated by
the titles of the guidebooks that they issue on asset forfeiture. See, e.g., MICHAEL GOLDSMrrH, U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, Ctv FoRlEntnR: TRACNG THEPROCEEDS OF NARCOTmcS TRAFICKNG (Supp. 1988 and 1992).
104 For the federal government, "the overwhelming majority" of asset forfeitures occur in drug traffick-
ing cases and drug-related money laundering. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNrrED STATES 11 (1994). Hence, one can find cases in which the government seizes an entire apartment
building because some of the apartments are used by tenants for drug selling. United States v. 141st Street
Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming seizure of building in which fifteen out of forty-one units
had drug trafficking activity). But I know of no company like Archer Daniels that has had its corporate fa-
cilities seized by the government in the context of a white collar criminal prosecution.
105 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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the important moral principle that lawyers should not accept ill-gotten gains
from their clients.
3. Responses to Other Concerns with a Strict Professional Standard
Although stricter professional standards for accepting fees paid from possi-
bly tainted funds would create incentives for a stronger public lawyering sys-
tem and a more egalitarian criminal justice system, it is not so clear that they
would generate a better or fairer system. If society drives more white collar
defendants to court-appointed lawyers, it might raise the overall quality of the
public lawyering system for criminal defendants, but at the same time, it might
reduce the possibility of an unusually good legal defense. In other words, the
floor of criminal defense work could rise, but the ceiling could be lowered.
Even the best public defender program could not hope to match the resources
of the elite, private bar.
In one view, it is not clear whether quality and fairness would be lost or
gained by trading a lower ceiling for a higher floor. Some defendants would
be better off, others would be worse off, and there is arguably no way to know
whether the higher floor is worth the lower ceiling.
However, the law of diminishing marginal utility gives reason to believe
that criminal defendants are better off with a higher floor and a lower ceiling
than a lower floor and a higher ceiling. The law of diminishing marginal util-
ity suggests that more is gained from improvements at lower levels than is lost
from diminutions at higher levels.'°n For example, a salary increase of $1,000
will have a more meaningful impact on the standard of living of someone
earning $25,000 a year than will a salary decrease of $1,000 on the standard of
living of someone earning $250,000 a year. Similarly, substituting a reasona-
bly well-paid public defender for a poorly-paid public defender could result in
a meaningful improvement in legal representation, while substituting a rea-
sonably-paid public defender for a highly-paid private lawyer would probably
result in only a trivial decline in the quality of legal representation.'O°
Driving more defendants to public defenders raises another potential prob-
lem. Currently, juries probably assume that defendants who use publicly-paid
108 See PAULA. SAMUEMSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCORY ANALYSIS 577-78 (lst ed. 1948).
109 Moreover, even though the reasonably-paid public defender will receive a lower income than the
highly-paid private lawyer, the public defender will receive an income similar to that of a prosecutor, mak-
ing it more likely that the quality of lawyering will become more equal between the prosecution and the de-
fense.
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counsel do so because they cannot afford a privately-paid attorney. However,
if private attorneys have to turn away defendants charged with economic
crimes when they think the defendant is guilty, juries might presume guilt in
economic crime cases in which defendants are represented by a publicly-paid
lawyer. In other words, the burden of proof might implicitly shift from the
prosecution to the defendant.
This does not seem to be a serious concern. Juries do not need to know
whether the defendant is being represented by a publicly or privately-paid at-
torney, and efforts can be made to keep that information confidential. In addi-
tion, from the fact that the prosecution has charged the defendant, a strong sus-
picion of guilt already is created in the minds of juries."0 The current system
protects against that suspicion by employing the reasonable doubt standard.
Even if the jury concludes that private lawyers thought it reasonably likely, or
more likely than not, that the defendant was guilty, the issue for the jury is
whether guilt has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.'
A final concern about strict standards for attorneys' fees in cases of eco-
nomic crime takes us back to an earlier argument for relatively lenient stan-
dards. If society forces most defendants in cases of economic crime to rely on
court-appointed lawyers, it compromises the independence of the criminal de-
fense bar. When lawyers are paid by the government, they are being paid by
their client's adversary, and that creates a potentially serious conflict of interest
for the lawyers. This is an important concern, and it requires a balancing of
competing considerations. If we try to reduce the number of cases in which
there is a conflict of interest for the criminal defense lawyer, we can do so only
by allowing lawyers to traffic in tainted funds. Moreover, the public lawyering
110 According to one survey, nearly two-thirds of people believe that criminal defendants should bear
the burden of proving their innocence at trial. See Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of Silence, the Presump-
tion of Innocence, the Burden of Proof and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRvmINOLOuGY 559, 560 n.4 (1996). This result is not surprising. As an anonymous author wrote:
Mhe so-called presumption of innocence in favor of the prisoner at bar is a pretence.... The
treatment of the prisoner negatives the presumption. If he is presumed innocent, why is he
manacled? Why is he put in jail? Why is he let out only on bail?... How can a person be pre-
sumed innocent who is presumably guilty?
JAMES C. MORTON & SCOTT C. HuTcmNsON, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 3 (1987).
11 This concern presents an additional argument for requiring lawyers to decline representation as long
as they have a reasonable suspicion of the defendant's guilt rather than when they think the preponderance
of the evidence points to the defendant's guilt. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text. The lower
the threshold used by lawyers to decline representation, the smaller the potential prejudice to the defendant
in the eyes of the jury.
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system would lose the benefit of a broadened constituency. There is no clear
way to resolve this matter. However, two considerations suggest that the risk
of a conflict of interest is tolerable.
First, the risk seems to be a reasonable trade-off for criminal defendants as
a class. In return for the prospect of a stronger system of court-appointed law-
yers, defendants must assume some risk that their attorney's loyalty will be
compromised. People will disagree about the trade-off, but most people
probably would prefer the more capable lawyer with the conflict of interest
than the less capable lawyer without the conflict of interest. Of course, for the
majority of criminal defendants, there will be no trade-off at all, as most de-
fendants already rely on court-appointed lawyers.12 For these defendants, the
conflict of interest posed by having one's lawyer paid by the government al-
ready exists. These defendants would benefit from the strengthening of the
public lawyering system. They also would benefit from a greater sense of
fairness because they no longer would be relegated to a less desirable form of
justice than other, wealthier criminal defendants.
A second, more compelling reason to tolerate the conflict of interest is that
experience with court-appointed lawyers illustrates their ability to remain in-
dependent. As indicated, criminal defendants commonly rely on court-
appointed lawyers already, and there has been no real concern that their repre-
sentation has been insufficiently vigorous because of their counsel's source of
income."' There is evidence that public defenders are, to some extent, co-
opted by their roles in the criminal justice system, but there is evidence that
privately paid defense lawyers are similarly co-opted. t4 Regardless of their
source of payment, it is in the interests of defense lawyers and their clients if
the lawyers have a good working relationship with judges and prosecutors.
Hence, while the independence of court-appointed lawyers is a legitimate con-
cern, it does not appear to raise the kinds of problems in practice that would
justify a compromise of the lawyer's obligation not to traffic in the il-gotten
gains of clients.
112 According to estimates, 75% of defendants are represented by court-appointed lawyers in cases in
which there is a right to counsel. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 53, at 820.
113 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the independence of court-appointed lawyers when it held
that public defenders do not act "under color of state law" when representing criminal defendants. Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
114 See Roy B. Hemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public Defenders in America's
Criminal Courts, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 393,397-400 (1989).
115 See id.
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CONCLUSION
Traditionally, academic analysis has been critical of laws or other rules that
interfere with the ability of criminal defendants to use their illicit gains for
legal representation. This critical tradition is not surprising, because the issue
tends to be viewed through the lens of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
But through the lens of lawyers' ethical obligations, the view is very different.
The obligation to reject fees that are paid out of ill-gotten gains leads to the
conclusion that lawyers should decline payment when there is reasonable
suspicion that some of the fee would represent tainted funds. The state's duty
not to interfere with the lawyer-client relationship does not entail an obligation
for attorneys to ignore their ethical duties when establishing lawyer-client
relationships.
Moreover, this conclusion does not reflect a failure to recognize the im-
portance of criminal defendants' right to counsel or society's interest in an ad-
versarial system with vigorous advocacy on both sides. Rather, it reflects the
fact that a more stringent ethical rule on lawyers' fees from defendants charged
with economic crimes may have positive rather than negative consequences for
criminal defendants and the criminal justice system. Given the uncertainty as
to the consequences, there is an insufficient basis for overriding the important
moral duty of lawyers to decline their clients' ill-gotten gains.
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